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Studying Music, Learning Law: A
Musical Perspective on Clinical Legal
Education
Alfred C. Aman, Jr.
These remarks were made at a Cornell alumni luncheon held on
April 15, 1986, at the Plaza Hotel in Rochester, New York.
I want to talk about an important issue in legal education
today: the role of clinical education in the law school cur-
riculum. I hope to shed some light on that issue by looking
at another professional school model-not the medical
school model, which is the usual approach, but the music
school model. I want to reflect on my experiences as a stu-
dent at the Eastman School of Music and my recent conver-
sations with Robert Freeman, the director of the Eastman
School, and members of the Eastman faculty. In so doing, I
want to suggest some parallels between musical and legal ed-
ucation that may enable us to see clinical legal education in
a different light.
The Clinical-Theoretical Debate
Any discussion of clinical legal education today inevitably
generates questions that go to the very heart of what we are
about. Just what is a law school? Is it a graduate school, or
is it a professional school? Are we interested primarily in le-
gal theory and techniques, or should we also be responsible
for the practical application of those theories and tech-
niques? If our curriculum does include a clinical compo-
nent, does it further a broad-based liberal arts approach to
legal education or does it undercut it? Moreover, how
should we treat the clinicians themselves? Should they
have tenure? Should we expect them to write the kinds of
theoretical articles that are traditionally the bill of fare of
law reviews, or should their work be more pragmatic? In-
deed, if clinical teachers are carrying a substantial caseload,
should they be expected to write in a genre other than the
legal briefs and memorandums that any busy law practice
generates? Do they need additional time to reflect on, and
then write about, their practical experiences? Perhaps
clinicians are and should be different from traditional law
professors. Is it perhaps the difference in their pedagogical
approaches to law that adds strength to a law school curricu-
lum, not their similarities to "traditional teachers"?
The nature and overall cost of clinical education raise
important issues of resource allocation as well. Clinical
teaching takes a great deal of time and effort. It is labor in-
tensive and does not lend itself easily to the paper-chase
model of legal education-one professor teaching 150 to
200 "terrified" students. Clinical teaching is expensive not
only from an institutional point of view but from a personal
point of view as well. Because it is time-consuming, it limits
the instructor's opportunity to be a reflective scholar.
From the student perspective clinical education fuels a
different controversy. There is, in the view of many stu-
dents and faculty alike, something called "the third-year
malaise." Our students learn how to play the Socratic game
well in the first year. Thereafter they want a change; they
want to begin to apply their skills in new and challenging
ways. Their level of motivation rises considerably when at
last they can perform in professional contexts. Many stu-
dents find that there are a number of factors relevant to suc-
cess in law practice that a blue-book examination cannot
test. Students who have been apathetic about law school
often come alive in a clinical setting.
Those different perspectives on clinical legal education
have generated a lively debate among professors in the law
school world. Those who emphasize the graduate school as-
pects of legal education may fear that clinical programs
might undermine the liberal arts basis of the curriculum,
while those who emphasize the professional school aspect of
law argue that we have an obligation to expose students to
the kinds of skills they will need to be effective lawyers.
While most faculty members believe that graduate and pro-
fessional school goals are not mutually exclusive, issues con-
cerning the form, content, and extent of clinical courses in
the law school curriculum continue to raise important dif-
ferences of opinion that are often difficult to resolve.
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Mnemosyne (mother of the Muses) and her sweet-voiced daugh-
ter, Kalliope
The Musical Model
To help gain insight into clinical legal education, legal edu-
cators have often looked to medical schools for guidance. I
think that is because medical schools employ the clinical
method of teaching so effectively. But aside from that, law
as a subject and medicine as a subject have little in com-
mon. Law is grounded largely in the humanities, medicine
in the sciences. I do not doubt that there is much to be
learned from the medical school model, ' but I propose to
posit a different model or, perhaps, a different simile. Legal
education is more like musical education than medical edu-
cation, and the professional music conservatory can be a
source of insight into the ongoing debates surrounding
clinical legal education.
Music is tied closely to the humanities and, perhaps
more than nonmusicians might think, requires not only
musical talent but a high degree of analytical and intellec-
tual ability. Understanding the structure of music, its his-
torical roots, and its creative possibilities has many simi-
larities to studying law. Moreover, though this is neither
the time nor the place to argue this point, I will nonetheless
assert that just as it may come as a surprise to nonmusicians
to realize how much of an intellectual structure exists in
music, it may be equally surprising to some to realize that
there is more emotion involved in law than might first meet
the eye. I am not talking about the kind of emotion that a
masterful trial lawyer can arouse as he or she succeeds in
moving a jury to tears on behalf of a client. I am talking
about the kind of sensitivity, feeling, and intuition that
goes into what we call legal creativity. How does a lawyer
decide how to phrase an issue? How does a lawyer decide
which arguments to prefer over others? How does a lawyer
decide which strategy to follow or how best to present a par-
ticular kind of case to certain judges? Just as none of us is
born full grown, legal disputes, especially those on the fron-
tiers of the law, rarely present themselves in a tidy fashion,
ready to fit snugly into some pre-existing legal pigeonhole.
Creativity and judgment as well as technique come into
play as a first-class lawyer goes about his or her tasks.
One of the insights that I took away from my recent
conversations with members of the composition department
at the Eastman School was that they recognize not only the
importance of technique, but the need they have as educa-
tors to foster, to encourage, and, yes, even to teach creativ-
ity and its handmaiden, judgment. I think that same need
to foster, encourage, and teach creativity exists in the law
school setting as well. To explain that statement, let me
make my comparisons between legal and musical education
more specific. In the process I must be a bit autobiographical.
As an undergraduate at the University of Rochester, I
spent a good deal of time at the Eastman School of Music. I
was not a music major, but the study of music was one of my
primary interests. Long before entering college, I began
studying drums, piano, and arranging. I toyed with the idea
of pursuing music as a career, and that, among other reasons,
was why I never considered going anywhere but to the Uni-
versity of Rochester. The Eastman School opened up a
world that existed no place else, and it gave me a chance to
pursue the aspects of music I cared most about-jazz, per-
cussion, and arranging. When I finally decided (much to
the relief of my parents) to go to law school, it may have
seemed like a dramatic shift in intellectual focus and one
that would take me in a very different educational direc-
tion. It was not. And to the extent anyone can be intellec-
tually prepared for the rigors of law school, I believe that
I was. What any serious musician learns early on is the
value of technique, the need to master your instrument.
That does not happen overnight. As John Gardner has said,
"Mastery is not something that strikes in an instant, like a
thunderbolt, but it is a gathering power that moves through
time, like weather. " 2 It takes years of intense work-scales,
arpeggios, and exercises. No one expects that kind of play-
ing to be music. It is as unappealing to listen to as a jack-
hammer, but it is necessary for a true command of one's in-
strument. Of course feeling and musicality are what all
serious players strive for, but they know that without at least
a modicum of technique they are doomed to waste their
finest feelings on the wrong notes. Discipline, mastery of
one's instrument, and a knowledge of the effort that goes
into a first-rate musical performance precede the ability to
perform and create with the facility of a real artist.
For me much of law school, the first year in particular,
was very similar to music school. We were learning tech-
niques-the technique of reading a case and the technique
of reading statutes and engaging in legal reasoning and legal
discourse. Classrooms were just big practice rooms where
we could learn our analytical skills and to read much
more carefully than ever before. I was not necessarily look-
ing for great moral or political revelations, not because I did
not think they were important, but because I was, to use the
musicians' vernacular, developing my "chops."
But though every music student knows that technique
is but a means to a creative end, there is a tendency in the
law school setting for students, usually unconsciously, to
begin to treat technique as an end in itself. It is difficult to
have the imagination necessary to convert the classroom
hypotheticals and cases-the scales and exercises-into ac-
tual performances. Moreover, there is a tendency for stu-
dents to take on the role of senior partner-or law pro-
fessor-when confronted with classroom exercises. They
can easily become too detached and critical, pointing out
what this or that court did wrong or why this argument or
that argument won't fly. Much of our analytical technique
building is based on the ability to be critical and to spot the
flaws in one's own and in another's argument. That is all
well and good, but it can have a tendency to inhibit con-
structive creativity-the ability to posit one's own solutions
to a problem. I sometimes think that we do a better job of
training law students to play the role of the senior partner
than preparing them to be the laboring oars that most young
lawyers will have to be. By "laboring oars" I do not mean
they will be engaged solely in the mundane tasks of lawyer-
ing, but the creative ones as well. And those require a con-
structive legal approach and creative, positive energy if they
are to succeed.
The ability to create takes imagination, and the ability
to choose among various approaches requires judgment.
Can one teach creativity? Can one teach judgment? I be-
lieve so. And it is in achieving those pedagogical goals that
clinical education combined with a first-rate technical and
theoretical education can be of enormous value. To explain
how those crucial skills-creativity and judgment-can be
fostered in a clinical setting, let me describe a class I took at
the Eastman School nearly twenty years ago. As a law
teacher, I have often reflected on that class, and I continue
to draw on it as a source of pedagogical inspiration.
The course, taught by Ray Wright and Manny Albam,
involved jazz arranging and composition. Our goal was to
write and arrange music for various-sized groups-small
combos, big bands, and big bands supplemented by string
sections and orchestral sounds such as french horns and
oboes. The course lasted three weeks, and it culminated in a
concert at Eastman Theater called the Arranger's Holiday
Concert. Everyone involved in the course, including our
teachers, Ray and Manny, wrote for that show.
Our classes consisted of analysis of famous arrangers-
their styles and their use of the band, orchestra, or combo.
The focus of the course, however, was our own arrange-
ments. They were played by a first-rate band almost as soon
as we finished them (and sometimes, it seemed, before).
Classes were then devoted to an analysis of what each of us
had done. We listened to the tapes with our scores spread
out before us. Ray or Manny would stop the tapes to com-
ment on both the good and bad aspects of an arrangement.
They were critical and constructive. They taught us not
only what and how something seemed to work, but, more
importantly, they taught us how to learn from our mistakes.
That is the beginning of wisdom. Learning that something
doesn't work the way you thought it would is one thing, but
learning how to learn from the experience is judgment.
That is why wisdom and experience do not correlate with
one another unless you know how to reflect on the good and
bad of what you have done. There was something enor-
mously stimulating about the process. We were analyzing
our own work, trying to see how it fit or didn't fit with
other, broader approaches to similar musical problems. At
the same time we were not just students but creators of mu-
sic as well. We were not passive receptors of knowledge or
critique; we were putting our very selves down on paper.
Professor Alfred Aman rehearsing with his modern jazz group,
The Greenhouse Effect
Nor were our teachers just critics and sources of infor-
mation and knowledge. They were performers as well.
Since they were helping us to write for the concert and also
were writing their own arrangements, they were directly en-
gaged in the creative enterprise. We all had to perform. We
had a common enterprise, and we pooled our talents and
energy to achieve a common end.
The educational value and stimulation of that course
have stayed with me for these twenty years, and I think that
there are some insights that we can learn from that ap-
proach that are applicable to the law school setting. First,
there is enormous learning value in the teacher's being
viewed not only as a critic but as a performer as well. If
nothing else, seeing an experienced professional in the act of
creation can convince a student how much work is involved.
But it also teaches in more-subtle ways. In music and in law
there are many approaches to problems, and seeing how ex-
perienced professionals solve them can give the perceptive
student insight into how one goes about such creative tasks.
Moreover, when both student and teacher are involved in a
common enterprise, the barrier between student and
teacher is sharply diminished. There is a creative spon-
taneity that that kind of atmosphere can encourage. We are
all creators; we are all engaged in similar tasks. That does
not mean that student and teacher are equals in knowledge
or experience, but it does mean that we are all professionals.
The equal footing implies equal responsibility. And what
one senses in such a setting is the responsibility that being a
professional entails. I have often thought that at some point
in law school we have to begin to move students from the
reflective and analytic, but often receptive and passive, role
to a more active professional role. They too are young crea-
tors of law, not just learners.
Second, the emphasis in class and in our final product
was on imagination, judgment, and the need to exercise
those talents and skills within a strict time frame. We had a
show to write. On August 4 we knew there would be two
thousand or more people in Eastman Theater because we
told them that we would give them something worth listen-
ing to.
In the legal setting, performance pressure translates
into greater emphasis on the creation of an argument, not
just a critique of an appellate court opinion or the argument
made by losing counsel. But that creativity goes further
than an off-the-top-of-the-head answer to a question posed
in class that, in effect, asks, What would you do?
Let me mention a course I recently supervised called
the Death Penalty Seminar. We took on a real case in
which the death penalty had been imposed. The Georgia
Supreme Court had turned down the defendant's appeal.
Five students and I prepared and filed a petition for cer-
tiorari with the U.S. Supreme Court. The case was diffi-
cult-there is little room these days for success in this area
of the law-but the students had to face firsthand both the
difficulty and exhilaration of creating legal arguments out of
a record several thousand pages long. They soon learned
that claims that an argument won't fly, and the critical de-
tachment that keeps us from going down the wrong path,
did not help when it came to creating an argument that
would work. Our essential task was one of creation, not just
criticism. That takes imagination, and, in my view, a dif-
ferent, more positive kind of mental energy. I believe that
students need more opportunities like that, and that is what
a vibrant and active clinical program can provide.
Finally, as I reflect on those classes with Ray Wright, I
am reminded of a metaphor that I think we should strive to
incorporate in our legal education efforts. Students should
be seen and treated as aspiring artists, not technicians. A
first-rate lawyer is an artist. He or she has the technique
necessary to handle the easy cases and answer the basic
questions but also the creativity and judgment to put form
and shape into an amorphous set of facts that do not neatly
fit a ready-made legal pigeonhole. Knowing the questions to
ask to formulate the appropriate issue is not just a technical
skill. It is a creative, imaginative task. As artists, students
will be expected to have the technique of their craft well in
hand, but the goal is not technique for technique's sake.
We need to inspire an appreciation of the creative role of
law and a sense of what it means to mix vision with skill,
and wisdom with action. To do that takes theory and tech-
nique, but it also requires an opportunity to try one's hand
at actual lawyering. We need our own arranger holiday
concerts in law school so that aspiring young lawyers can
experience the need for the artistry necessary to produce
first-class work and so that they can see how the exercises,
scales, and arpeggios of the classroom are converted into an
actual performance in the courtroom or at the negotiating
table. That is what clinical education can do and is doing at
Cornell. In short, teaching theory and technique alone is
not enough. The application of techniques and theories in
live situations fosters the imagination and judgment that
are essential to first-class lawyering. It can enable us to
teach that, in the words of the immortal tune by Duke
Ellington, "It don't mean a thing if it ain't got that swing."
Alfred C. Aman, Jr., teaches Ad-
ministrative Law, Constitutional
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1. See, for example, Roger Cramton's excellent paper "Medical
and Legal Education: Learning from Each Other," Health Affairs
(fall 1986).
2. John Gardner, The Art of Fiction (A. Knopf, 1983).
